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Abstract The pervasive influence of partisanship on political evaluations is well
known and understood. Whether citizens rely on their policy attitudes has received
less attention, especially in the context of how people update and revise their
evaluations. This paper focuses on presidential assessments and uses panel data
covering three presidencies to model the determinants of opinion change. The
results indicate that policy preferences (like partisanship) exert a regular and sub-
stantial influence on how citizens update their presidential evaluations.
Keywords Issues  Policy preferences  Presidential approval  Partisanship  Party
identification  Updating
In politics, citizens rarely act immediately upon forming their opinions about
candidates for elective office. Political campaigns extend over time, offering ample
opportunities for people to update and revise their opinions. Candidates, once
elected, typically serve over a period of years before facing the electorate to seek
reelection. Thus how people update and revise their evaluations of elected officials
is important for understanding the nature of democratic accountability.
This paper focuses on the process by which ordinary citizens update their
presidential assessments. Most previous research on presidential evaluations focuses
on either the dynamics of aggregate presidential approval or cross-sectional
I appreciate advice and criticism from Cindy Kam, Laura Stoker, Nick Valentino, the participants in the
Institute of Governmental Studies Research Workshop on American Politics at UC Berkeley, and the
reviewers and editors for Political Behavior.
B. Highton (&)




Polit Behav (2012) 34:57–78
DOI 10.1007/s11109-010-9156-3
differences at a single point in time.1 Analyses of change in individual evaluations
are rare. Rarer still are examinations of individual change that focus on policy
attitudes. While there appears to be a regular and substantial influence of
partisanship (Bartels 2002), the extent to which people routinely rely on their
policy attitudes as day-to-day political events unfold is unknown. As a result, many
questions about the nature of public opinion, how people process and respond to
new information, and the role of individual attitudes for moderating how public
opinion develops over time remain unanswered.2
Determining if policy attitudes shape how people update their presidential
evaluations is important for theoretical and normative reasons. Theoretically, there
are key connections to questions about information exposure and processing raised
by political psychologists. The early Columbia studies established that through their
decisions and social networks people are selectively exposed to political informa-
tion that is likely to accord with their partisan inclinations (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948;
Berelson et al. 1954). Recent research focuses on ‘‘motivated reasoning’’ to explain
how people process the information to which they are exposed and identifies a
variety of mechanisms by which people may arrive at different assessments even
when exposed to identical information (Lodge and Taber 2000). The work on
motivated reasoning provides the causal underpinning for the famous observation
by Stokes (1966) about the ‘‘subtle processes of perceptual adjustment by which the
individual assembles an image of current politics consistent with his partisan
allegiance’’ (p. 127). In relation to the president, citizens may be motivated to
maintain evaluations consistent with their partisanship. However, because presi-
dents also take positions on policy, the theory of motivated reasoning may also be
important for understanding the role of policy attitudes in the process of updating.
Assessing how people revise their political evaluations in light of their policy and
partisan attitudes also relates to important normative questions. Democratic theory
often presumes that ordinary citizens base their evaluations of political leaders on
how closely their preferences match the positions endorsed and opposed by leaders.
If this condition holds, then mass support for the president provides justification for
the president’s policy agenda. But, Converse warns that ‘‘it is difficult to keep in
mind that the true motivations and comprehensions of supporters may have little or
nothing to do with the distinctive beliefs of the endorsed elite (Converse 1964,
p. 249, emphasis added). If people respond primarily in partisan terms, then ‘‘party
bias’’ is pervasive, pushing aside more ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘democratic’’ updating in
response to policy attitudes. However the different types of updating are labeled, the
meaning of changes in public opinion depends on the relative contributions of
partisanship and policy attitudes even if the same general process—motivated
reasoning—underlies both because ‘‘in [democratic] theory of course the party
1 Gronke and Newman (2003) provide an excellent synthesis of the research on presidential evaluations.
2 This paper addresses the understudied question of how policy attitudes influence changes in opinion
about the president. In so doing, it also considers the influence of partisanship as it is unwise to assess the
influence of one without taking into account the other given the ongoing—and growing—association
between the two (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Adams 1997; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman and
Carsey 2002; Stimson 2004; Brewer 2005; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009;
Claassen and Highton 2009).
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usually has little rationale for its existence save as an instrument to further particular
policy preferences. The policy is the end, and the party is the means’’ (Converse
1964, pp. 240–241). Thus, updating that brings opinions in line with policy attitudes
may be interpreted as consistent with normative views about the proper role of the
political process while updating influenced by partisanship is more problematic.
Dynamic Accounts of Presidential Evaluations
The immense literature on the causes of aggregate presidential approval serves as my
starting point. Studies in this tradition emphasize the role of ‘‘valence issues’’ (Stokes
1963) like peace, prosperity, and security for explaining how presidential approval
changes over time. On issues like these, there is consensus within the mass public
about end goals and the public appears to evaluate the president on the basis of
outcomes. Positive outcomes lead to heightened approval while negative outcomes
produce lower approval, regardless of whether the president’s actions are responsible
(Kernell 1978; Hibbs et al. 1982; MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Brody
1991; Newman 2002; Erikson et al. 2002). When economic performance is strong and
the country is at peace, presidential approval improves, and when the economy falters
and unsuccessful war efforts continue, approval declines.
A straightforward individual level model of presidential evaluations implied by
the aggregate studies is:
Eit ¼ a þ b1  Ei;t1 þ eit ð1Þ
Eit denotes an individual’s current evaluation of the president and Ei,t-1 denotes the
individual’s evaluation at an earlier time. Because evaluations are updated, not
determined anew, b1 is expected to be nonzero and positive. The effects of events
during the period determine if there is a shift up (a[ 0) or down (a\ 0) in approval.
Finally, random, individual disturbances (eit) influence current evaluations.
3
If everyone responded to new events and information in a uniform manner, then
(1) would be sufficient to model the process. But, the enormous literature on
partisanship suggests that this is unlikely. In a famous passage, Campbell et al.
(1960, p. 133) write that ‘‘identification with a party raises a perceptual screen
through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan
orientation.’’As mentioned earlier, the Columbia voting studies identified ‘‘selective
exposure’’ as one mechanism by which partisanship might operate in this fashion
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954). Recent research has elaborated on this
notion. For example, the political leanings of the newspapers people read, talk radio
programs they listen to, and internet sites they visit are all related to their political
predispositions in a manner that is likely to reinforce, rather than challenge, those
3 The model in Eq. 1 and subsequent ones are models of change (Finkel 1995); a (and b2, b3, and b4 in
subsequent models) are parameters of change in E. Straightforward algebra shows this directly:
Eit ¼ a þ b1  Ei;t1 þ eit ð1Þ
Eit  Ei;t1 ¼ a þ b1  Ei;t1  Ei;t1 þ eit
DEi ¼ a þ b1  1ð Þ  Ei;t1 þ eit:
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predispositions (Stroud 2008), a relationship that is likely growing stronger as media
choices proliferate (Prior 2007). Studies of partisanship and social networks show
that people are more likely to discuss politics with those who share their
partisanship (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mutz 2006).4 In addition, work on information
processing and ‘‘motivated reasoning’’ shows that people pay more attention to
information that supports their views, they attach more weight to information that
supports their views, they more easily accept information that is consistent with
their preexisting views, they expend more cognitive effort to disconfirm information
inconsistent with their preexisting views, and they construe the implications of the
information in ways that are consistent with their preexisting views(Lodge and
Taber 2000; Taber et al. 2001; Taber and Lodge 2006; Gaines et al. 2007).
One implication of ‘‘selective exposure’’ and ‘‘motivated reasoning’’ is that
people may not update their evaluations of the president in the uniform way implied
by Eq. 1. Suppose that the economy improves under a Republican president from
t - 1 to t. People who were Republicans at t – 1 will probably give the president
too much credit while people who were Democrats at t – 1 may not give the
president enough. Because partisanship shapes the information to which people are
exposed and how they process it, ‘‘party bias’’ may be an important component for
how people update their presidential evaluations.
Perhaps they rely on different sources of political information with distinctive
partisan colorations. Perhaps they attach more salience to perceptions
consistent with their partisan predispositions than to discordant perceptions.
Whatever the mechanism (or mechanisms) may be, the result is that
perceptions of political events are colored by pre-existing partisan loyalties
(Bartels 2002, p. 24).
If there is party bias, then preexisting partisanship (PIDt-1) will influence how
people update and revise their presidential evaluations in light of the information
disseminated between t – 1 and t:
Eit ¼ a þ b1  Ei;t1 þ b2  PIDi;t1 þ eit ð2Þ
Party bias implies b2 = 0; those with different partisan attachments do not
respond in the same way.5
Policy Attitudes and Presidential Evaluations
There is consensus about desirable outcomes like peace, prosperity, and security.
However, on questions about the best way to pursue them, there is often
disagreement. ‘‘Position issues’’ (Stokes 1963) contrast with valence issues because
they relate to the means employed to achieve policy goals, and people differ with
4 While there is some disagreement about the amount of partisan heterogeneity within social networks,
there is widespread agreement that, in general, Democrats are more likely to discuss politics with
Democrats and Republicans are more likely to talk about politics with Republicans.
5 Equation 2 is the model used in Bartels (2002). Lagged partisanship (rather than contemporaneous
partisanship) is included to model the notion that current evaluations are influenced by the interaction of
preexisting partisanship with new information.
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regard to their preferences and attitudes on position issues. For example, on issues
about social welfare, some are economic liberals, favoring government efforts to
reduce economic inequality and guarantee at least a minimal standard of living, and
others are economic conservatives, preferring less government involvement and
greater reliance on the free market. While it is not plausible that many people in the
mass public have specific preferences over a range of specific policy questions
within issue domains (Bartels 2003) there is strong evidence that on broader
questions of policy (e.g., economic issues and cultural issues, in general) people
have quite stable preferences and attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. 2008).6
Is it possible that people rely on their stable economic and cultural policy
attitudes when they update their presidential evaluations? Theoretically, there are
three conditions that must hold. First, for people to rely on issue attitudes, they must
have them, and recent evidence suggests that they do (Ansolabehere et al. 2008;
Layman and Carsey 2002).The second condition is that presidents must take
positions on the issues. In the absence of presidential position taking, the
opportunity to update assessments based on policy would not exist. Like the first
condition, this one is met. Presidents are not only the standard bearers of their
parties, and therefore plausibly the subject of party bias, presidents also differ with
regard to the policies they advocate. Substantial differences in ‘‘position taking’’
(Mayhew 1974) are easy to document. As one indicator consider the DW-
NOMINATE (McCarty et al. 1997, 2006) scores for the three presidents who are the
subject of the empirical analysis in this paper. These scores are based on public
positions taken by presidents on bills voted on in Congress. They measure relative
positions on an underlying ideological dimension that structures most of the roll call
voting in Congress. These scores typically range from -1 (the most liberal) to ?1
(the most conservative). The Republicans George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush
are scored .64 and .70, respectively, on the DW-NOMINATE scale compared to -
.52 for the Democrat Bill Clinton. While there is intraparty variation, for the most
part Republican presidents in recent American politics take conservative economic
and cultural positions while Democrats take liberal ones.
The third necessary condition complements the second, relating to the
opportunity to base presidential evaluations on policy attitudes. Presidential
positions must be public and information about them disseminated to the mass
citizenry. This condition also appears to be met. Through a wide variety of means,
information about presidential positions may diffuse through the mass public.
People read about politics in newspapers and on the internet; they listen to radio
programs about politics; they watch network and cable news programs; and, even if
they do not have direct media exposure, they often discuss politics with people who
do. Certainly the general public forms distinctively different ideological
6 As discussed by both Bartels (2003) and Ansolabehere et al. (2008), the apparent influence of question
wording and low over-time correlations for single policy questions are not inconsistent with the existence
of real and enduring policy attitudes. To be sure, the case that people have preferences regarding specific
policies within issue domains is harder to make convincingly than the case that people have preferences
(or attitudes) regarding the broad issue domains like economics issues and cultural issues. I use the terms
‘‘policy preferences’’ and ‘‘policy attitudes’’ interchangeably to refer to the locations of people with
regard to these general policy domains.
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impressions of presidents as shown in Table 1. Using the standard NES question
that asks respondents to use a seven point ideology scale ranging from 1 (very
liberal) to 7 (very conservative), the table shows the average placement for each
president along with the average placement given to House members from their
respective parties. Notice that the differences between presidents from the two
parties are larger than those for House members. The public perceives an
ideological divide between Democratic and Republican presidents that is larger than
the perceived divide between Democratic and Republican members of Congress.
With the necessary conditions for updating with respect to policy preferences
likely met, the evaluation model should allow for the possibility:
Eit ¼ a þ b1  Ei;t1 þ b2  PIDi;t1 þ b3  ECONi;t1 þ b4  CULTi;t1 þ eit
ð3Þ
Policy updating occurs with respect to economic policy attitudes (ECON) if
b3 = 0 and cultural policy attitudes (CULT) if b4 = 0. Equally important is how b3
and b4 compare to b2.
7 The normative significance derives not merely from
establishing whether there is updating in response to issues, but from how the
magnitude compares to the amount of party bias.8
Previous research also suggests the plausibility of policy updating. First, the theory
of motivated reasoning can be extended to this area. Extant research shows that when
presented with information that relates to what policy preferences they should hold,
people tend to respond in a manner consistent with their prior beliefs. For example,
citizens ‘‘who favor gun control or affirmative action rate congruent arguments as
stronger than incongruent arguments, while those opposed see the con arguments as
stronger’’ (Taber and Lodge 2006, p. 760). Thus there are psychological forces that
operate to maintain one’s partisanship and policy attitudes. When the object of
evaluation is the president, these forces may work to produce updating with respect to
Table 1 Perceived ideological locations of recent presidents
President Years President’s Average perceived ideology of
perceived ideology president’s party House members
Bush (H.W.) 1990, 1992 4.9 4.8
Clinton 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 3.1 3.7
Bush (W.) 2004 5.2 4.9
Perceived ideology is measured with a scale ranging from 1 (‘‘very liberal’’) to 7 (‘‘very conservative’’). Cell
entries report the mean values across respondents. For comparability, only respondents who provided ideo-
logical ratings of the president and their House member are included. The questions were not asked in 2002
7 As in the case of partisanship, lagged policy attitudes are included rather than contemporaneous ones to
capture the notion that people respond to the information disseminated between t - 1 and t on the basis of
their preexisting attitudes (ECONt-1, CULTt-1, and PIDt-1). To the extent that attitudes change between
t - 1 and t and those changes in attitudes influence Et, model (3) is incomplete. However, the impressive
stability of partisan and policy attitudes over the short-term suggests that attitude change is minimal,
mitigating—at least to some degree—this concern (Ansolabehere et al. 2008).
8 Related, given that partisanship and policy attitudes are correlated, the inclusion of policy attitudes may
diminish the apparent effects of partisanship. This, in turn, would suggest that the exclusion of policy
attitudes from the model—as is often the case in previous research—leads to an overestimate of the
magnitude of party bias. I return to this point later.
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policy. For example, consider a Democratic president who takes liberal positions on
economic policy. As discussed earlier, Democrats and Republicans should respond
differently to information regarding valence issues. At the same time, given the
psychological importance people appear to attach to their policy views, one would
expect economic liberals to react more favorably than economic conservatives
(independent of partisanship).
A second reason suggesting the plausibility that policy updating occurs is found in
cross-sectional studies of presidential evaluations and voting behavior. When policy
preferences are included in these models, nontrivial effects are often reported
(Newman 2003; Abramowitz 1995; Aldrich et al. 1989; Miller and Shanks 1996;
Ansolabehere et al. 2008; Goren 2002). While this does not automatically imply that
policy attitudes influence how people revise their presidential assessments, it certainly
raises the possibility. Third, studies of presidential evaluations in the wake of major
political events are also suggestive. For instance, one study compared the cross-
sectional structure of the public’s assessments of President Reagan before and after the
revelation that his administration had secretly diverted money from arms sales to Iran
to support the Nicaraguan Contras (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). After the revelation
and the massive media coverage of it, the alignment between foreign policy attitudes
and assessments of Reagan were stronger than before. Krosnick and Kinder attribute
the change to the substantial media coverage of the event that ‘‘primed’’ policy
attitudes by providing relevant information and enhancing their salience. Another
study is similar (Peffley et al. 1995). Peffley et al. (1995) focuses on the U.S. bombing
of Libya in 1986 and using panel data collected before and after the bombing find that
preexisting foreign policy attitudes shaped whether people approved of the bombing,
which in turn, influenced how people updated their presidential evaluations.9 Both
studies suggest that dramatic political events may prime policy attitudes as a result of
the media attention they generate.10 What remains unknown is what happens in the
absence of a ‘‘highly publicized and dramatic revelation’’ (Krosnick and Kinder 1990,
p. 498) or a ‘‘highly publicized [event]… followed by a dramatic televised
[presidential] address’’ (Peffley et al. 1995, p. 309). If policy updating is limited to
instances like these, then it is hardly the case that policy attitudes routinely shape how
people revise their presidential assessments as day-to-day political events unfolds.
While there is a plausible case for policy updating to be made, it should also be
noted that some previous research raises doubt and expresses skepticism. The
9 A third study also analyzes the role of ‘‘policy attitudes’’ for shaping responses to a dramatic political
event (Edwards and Swenson 1997). However, the measures of policy attitudes employed in Edwards and
Swenson (1997) when analyzing the missile attack on Iraq’s intelligence headquarters in 1993 are better
characterized as preexisting presidential evaluations; the questions are less about policy means and more
about assessing the president. For example, the items included in the measure of foreign policy attitudes
‘‘include evaluations of Clinton’s handling of foreign policy in general, particularly that of Yugoslavia
and Somalia, and the levels of confidence and trust in his handling of international crises’’ (Edwards and
Swenson 1997, p. 203).
10 Because Krosnick and Kinder (1990) rely on cross-sectional data collected before and after the
revelation, one cannot be sure that policy attitudes were actually primed. If people who already had
positive evaluations of Reagan updated their policy attitudes in response to the revelations then causality
runs in the other direction. Peffley et al. (1995) is stronger in this regard because it relies on panel data
with policy attitudes measured prior to the political event.
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authors of the American Voter did not just contend that ‘‘responses to each element
of national politics are deeply affected by the individual’s enduring party
attachments’’ (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 128). They argued that ‘‘the stable qualities
of the public’s response to political affairs have to do primarily with long-term
loyalties to the parties rather than ideological commitments against which current
acts or policies of the parties could be evaluated’’ (Campbell et al. 1960, emphasis
added). In a similar vein, an influential and more recent study (Rahn 1993) claims
that ‘‘when voters have both particular [policy] information and party stereotypes
available… [they] neglect policy information in reaching evaluations’’ (Rahn 1993,
p. 492). Other studies have analyzed updating with regard to partisanship without
considering issues (Markus 1982; Finkel 1993; Bartels 2002), implicitly assuming
that policy updating is not an important part of the process.
Data and Measures
The primary empirical aim of this paper is to estimate the influence of policy
attitudes on how people revise their presidential assessments. To do this I rely on
American National Election Study (ANES) panel datasets that span three recent
presidencies. The 1990-91-92 panel covers the last 2 years of George H.W. Bush’s
administration. The 1992-94-96 panel spans the first 4 years of the Clinton
presidency. The 2000-02-04 covers the first term of George W. Bush’s adminis-
tration. For each president, there are two opportunities to observe and estimate the
parameters of updating in Eq. 3, from the first year of the panel to the second, and
from the second year of the panel to the third. By examining six cases across three
different presidencies that vary by (a) party of president, (b) whether overall
presidential assessments improved or declined, and (c) the amount of aggregate
change, the possibility of mistakenly attributing idiosyncratic effects to more
general processes is reduced.11
To measure policy attitudes, I follow Ansolabehere et al. (2008), which
recommends creating multiple indicator scales of broad issue preferences on the
grounds that while individual items tend to include substantial measurement error,
scales based on many items produce far more ‘‘signal’’ than ‘‘noise.’’12 Specifically,
the procedure in Ansolabehere et al. (2008) involves (i) identifying all available
questions in a survey for a designated policy area, (ii) factor analyzing those items,
and (iii) computing factor scores for the first factor, which serve as measures for
subsequent analyses.13 The result is a scale that differentiates respondents with more
liberal issue orientations from those with more conservative tendencies. For
11 At the same time, these are the only panel studies that are available for analysis that meet the necessary
data requirements to estimate the assessment models.
12 See also Bartels (2010). Abramowitz (2010) does something similar, creating an issue scale based on a
large number of available items. One important difference is that Abramowitz combines economic and
cultural items into a single scale while Ansolabehere et al. (2008) and Bartels (2010) create separate
policy attitude scales.
13 As Ansolabehere et al. (2008) note, they consistently find a single dominant dimension within issue
domains. There do not appear to be multiple economic dimensions or multiple cultural dimensions.
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example, for the economic attitudes scales, questions asking respondents to choose a
preferred position or location on specific items like whether the government should
guarantee people jobs and whether federal spending on the poor should be increased
or decreased along with more general questions about egalitarianism and the proper
role of government are included.14 The cultural issue scales typically include
questions about abortion policy, laws regarding the treatment of homosexuals, and
views regarding morality.15 The complete lists of questions used to create all of the
issue scales are provided in the Appendix.16
To measure partisanship I rely on three items, also following Ansolabehere et al.
(2008). The first is based on the standard ANES questions that ask respondents
whether they consider themselves Democrats or Republicans, whether those
feelings are strong, and if respondents do not consider themselves partisans, whether
they feel closer to one of the two parties. The second and third items are feeling
thermometers for the respective parties. Factor scores based on factor analyses of
the three items serve as the measure of partisanship.17
Previous research establishes clear links between partisanship and issue
preferences that have grown stronger over time, especially with regard to cultural
issues (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Adams 1997; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Layman and Carsey 2002; Stimson 2004; Brewer 2005; Baldassarri and Gelman
2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Claassen and Highton 2009; Abramowitz 2010).
These patterns are evident in the data used here; the average correlation between
partisanship and economic attitudes is .56; the average correlation between
partisanship and cultural attitudes is .35.18 In light of these correlations the
interpretations of the effects of issues and partisanship on presidential evaluations
are based on the estimated effects of moving one standard deviation on the scales
rather than across the full ranges of the respective scales.
To measure evaluations (E), I rely on a variety of indicators in the ANES
surveys. The most commonly asked question (included in every wave of every
14 By including more general items that indicate what have been called ‘‘core beliefs and values’’
(Feldman 1988) and ‘‘policy related predispositions’’ (Miller and Shanks 1996), the policy scales are
broader than those typically used in previous research. This decision was based on several considerations.
Bartels (2003) argues that due to framing effects, question wording effect, and a host of other factors, the
answers people give in response to even narrow questions about policy reveal more about general
‘‘attitudes’’ than specific policy preferences. Likewise Ansolabehere et al. (2008) finds that specific and
general questions within policy domains are indicators of underlying, latent, issue orientations.
15 Because there substantially fewer cultural items included in the surveys, following Ansolabehere et al.
(2008) I also include some group thermometer items (e.g., ‘‘the women’s movement’’ and ‘‘gay men and
lesbians’’) in the scale of cultural attitudes.
16 There were hardly any policy attitude questions included in the 1991 and 2002 surveys. As a result
when predicting change in presidential assessments from 1991 to 1992, I employ the measures of policy
attitudes from 1990 and when predicting change in assessments from 2002 to 2004 I use the measures of
policy attitudes from 2000. Because of the high stability in policy attitudes over short periods of time
(Ansolabehere et al. 2008), this is unlikely to be problematic.
17 The apparent influence of partisanship is somewhat larger when using the partisanship factor scores
instead of the traditional seven point measure of partisanship alone.
18 There is not much change in the partisanship/economic attitudes correlation across the surveys, but the
partisanship/cultural attitudes correlation increases from .23 in the 1990–1992 panel to .44 in the
2000–2004 panel.
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survey) is the feeling thermometer, which asks respondents to rate the person on a
100 point scale. Questions about presidential approval are also asked in every
survey, but because Clinton and Bush had not yet served in 1992 and 2000,
respectively, this indicator is not available for them in those years. The ANES
surveys also frequently ask respondents about how well traits like ‘‘honest’’ and
‘‘gets things done’’ describe presidents and presidential candidates. A fourth type of
question asks about emotions (e.g., ‘‘angry’’ and ‘‘hopeful’’) people have felt with
regard to presidents and presidential candidates. For each of the three panels I
identify all the indicators of assessments available. Where there are multiple
indicators in the same question format (e.g., a set of trait questions) I compute the
average response to those questions. To produce a composite presidential evaluation
measure (Eit), for each individual in each panel wave, I factor analyze the items and
compute factors scores from the first factor.19
Respondents are included in the analysis if they were interviewed in all three
waves of their respective panels and if they answered at least 50% of the questions
that comprise each of policy, partisanship, and evaluation scales. Limiting the
analysis to respondents interviewed in all three waves guarantees that any differences
in the effect estimates from one wave to the next are not due to sample composition
differences.20 Limiting the analysis to people who answered at least 50% of the items
in each of the scales reduces the number of cases only marginally, by less than 2% in
each of the three panels.21 The resulting sample sizes for the analyses of the 1990–
1992, 1992–1996, and 2000–2004 panels are 535, 592, and 744, respectively.
Findings
Table 2 provides the parameter estimates of Eq. 3 for the six cases across the three
presidencies.22 The first column of estimates in Table 2 reports the results for
President Bush from 1990–1991 and shows that both economic and cultural policy
attitudes influenced change in presidential evaluations. The estimate of b3 (.062,
standard error = .031) suggests divergent change associated with economic policy
attitudes; a difference of one standard deviation in economic preferences in 1990
19 In all the surveys a single dominant factor emerged. See the Appendix for the patterns of eigenvalues,
which demonstrate the point.
20 This is important, for example, when comparing the effects from 1992–1994 when Clinton changed
from being a presidential candidate to the president to those from 1994–1996. To be sure, restricting the
sample in this way does carry the disadvantage of making the sample less representative, which limits the
generalizability of the findings in the same way that survey non-response does.
21 Following Ansolabehere et al. (2008), imputations based on best-subset linear regression were used for
respondents with missing data on individual items. In the 1990-91-92 panel respondents were randomly
assigned to ‘‘form A’’ or ‘‘form B.’’ Form B respondents were not asked most of the policy attitude
questions and are therefore excluded from the analysis.
22 The variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Hence the cell
entries indicate the estimated effect of moving one standard deviation across the independent variables. In
addition all the variables were recoded so higher values are associated with more positive evaluations.
Thus, for Clinton, higher scores for partisanship and policy preferences indicate more Democratic and
liberal preferences. For the Bushes, higher scores indicate more Republican and conservative preferences.
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produced a difference in presidential evaluation change of .062 in 1991. Divergent
updating with regard to cultural policy attitudes is even more pronounced with an
estimated effect of .146 for a one standard deviation difference in cultural policy
preferences (b^4 = .146, standard error = .060). The influences of economic and
cultural policy attitudes suggest that people do not only respond to valence issues—
if they did, then b3 = 0 and b4 = 0—but that policy information was an important
component of the information environment between the 1990 and 1991.
The estimates in Table 2 also indicate the presence of party bias as Democrats
and Republicans (independent of their respective policy attitudes) did not have a
shared response to political events between 1990 and 1991 (b^2 = .142, standard
error = .034). The party bias estimate also helps to put the effects of policy
preferences in perspective. The difference in response associated with economic
preferences (.062) was a bit less than half the party bias effect while the influence of
cultural issues (.146) was essentially equal to the effect of party bias.
As it turns out, across the six cases spanning the three presidencies, the pattern
observed for updating evaluations of Bush from 1990 to 1991 is fairly typical.
Consistent with previous research (Bartels 2002), a regular influence of party bias is
evident. Across the six tests, the average party bias estimate is .178, and in all six
instances the null hypothesis of no party bias can be rejected at the .05 level. What is
new are the estimated effects of policy attitudes on updating. In all of the cases except
2002–2004, there is strong evidence that economic attitudes influenced how people
updated their evaluations (p \ .05). The average effect of .094 is bit more than half the
average effect of partisanship.23 Updating with respect to cultural attitudes is also
Table 2 Parameter estimates of presidential evaluations
H.W. Bush H.W. Bush Clinton Clinton W. Bush W. Bush
1990–1991 1991–1992 1992–1994 1994–1996 2000–2002 2002–2004
Prior evaluation (b^1) .608** .510** .399** .652** .564** .641**
(.032) (.034) (.042) (.035) (.038) (.024)
Prior partisanship (b^2) .142** .214** .223** .142** .139** .210**
(.034) (.034) (.043) (.036) (.040) (.027)
Prior economic
attitudes (b^3)
.062** .175** .162** .096** .082** -.016
(.031) (.032) (.038) (.031) (.032) (.024)
Prior cultural
attitudes (b^4)
.146** .060* .081** .024 .029 .161**




attitudes (b^3 þ b^4)
.207** .235** .242** .121** .111** .145**
(.039) (.041) (.043) (.035) (.039) (.029)
N 535 535 592 592 744 744
R2 .58 .56 .54 .70 .53 .74
All variables are standardized, and as a result the estimated intercepts are equivalent to zero and therefore
not reported in the table. ** p \ .05; * p \ .10
23 Across the five cases—excluding 2002-2004—the average effect of economic attitudes is .115.
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apparent. In four of the six cases (all but 1994–1996 and 2000–2002) the null hypothesis
of no effect can be rejected at either the .05 (1990–1991, 1992–1994, 2002–2004) or .10
(1991–1992) levels. Across all the cases, the average effect of .084 for cultural policy
attitudes is just modestly smaller than the average effect of economic preferences.
In addition to the separate effects of each policy attitude, Table 2 also reports the
estimated joint policy effects, which are the sums of separate effects. While economic
attitudes and cultural attitudes appear influential on their own, taken together their
effects are on par with those of partisanship. The joint effects range from .111
(2000–2002) to .242 (1992–1994), which is very similar to the range of .139
(2000–2002) to .223 (1992–1994) for partisanship. Likewise the average joint effect
of policy attitudes is almost identical to the average effect of partisanship, .177 versus
.178. The largest observed difference is for 2002–2004 where the estimate of party
bias is .210 and the estimated joint issue effect is .145. Even in this case, a statistical
test of the null hypothesis of no difference between the partisanship and joint policy
effect cannot be rejected at conventional levels (p = .17).
Because partisanship is correlated with economic and cultural attitudes,
evaluation models like Eq. 2 that exclude the possibility of policy updating may
exaggerate the magnitude of ‘‘party bias.’’ To determine how much the influence of
partisanship is overestimated when policy attitudes are excluded, I estimated Eq. 2
for the six cases under study here. Table 3 reports the results and compares them to
the ones from Table 2 that are based on Eq. 3, which includes policy attitudes. In
every case the estimated magnitude of party bias is larger when policy attitudes are
excluded with the average effect of .230 about 30% larger than the average effect of
.178 when policy attitudes are included. Although not trivial, this does not suggest
that previous studies like Markus (1982), Finkel (1993) and Bartels (2002) are
fundamentally wrong about party bias. Instead, previous work that does not model
policy updating is better characterized as incomplete, missing an important process
by which people revise their evaluations.
Finally, while the dependent variables in all instances are presidential evaluations,
in two cases (Bill Clinton in 1992–1994 and George W. Bush in 2000–2002) the
measure of prior evaluations is from the presidential campaign before the presidency
Table 3 Estimated effects of prior partisanship on presidential evaluations
H.W. Bush H.W. Bush Clinton Clinton W. Bush W. Bush Average
1990–1991 1991–1992 1992–1994 1994–1996 2000–2002 2002–2004









.188 .278 .291 .189 .185 .248 .230
Cell entries report the estimated effects of prior partisanship on presidential evaluations. The entries for
‘‘From model with policy attitudes’’ are from Table 2. The entries for ‘‘From model without policy
attitudes’’ are based on reestimating the models after excluding policy attitudes
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had even begun. As a consequence, one might expect prior evaluations to matter less,
and in both cases this appears to be the case. For Clinton from 1992–1994 to
1994–1996 the estimated influence of prior evaluations increases from .399 to .652; for
Bush from 2000–2002 to 2002–2004 the estimated influence increases from .564 to
.641. Moreover, the overall explained variation (R2) also increases from the first to
second periods, from .54 to .70 for Clinton and from .53 to .74 for Bush. However,
there are no clear patterns with regard to the influence of partisanship and policy
attitudes. In the case of Clinton, the increased influence of prior evaluations is
associated with diminished effects partisanship and policy attitudes, but the same is
not the case for Bush, suggesting no simple explanation for the interplay of forces as
the objects of evaluation move from presidential candidates to presidents.24
Discussion and Conclusion
Accounts of public opinion and voting behavior often give prominence to ‘‘the role of
enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects’’ (Camp-
bell et al. 1960, p. 135). The proposition that people respond to new political events and
information on the basis of their preexisting partisanship and revise their political
evaluations accordingly is well grounded theoretically and has received ample empirical
support. Typically left unexamined has been the role that policy attitudes play when
citizens update their political evaluations. For example, Bartels (2002) conducts ‘‘92
distinct analyses of opinion change’’ to investigate the ‘‘pervasiveness of partisan bias in
political perceptions and evaluations’’ (p. 130). While party bias does appear
pervasive—a finding reinforced in this paper—none of the analyses in Bartels (2002)
allows for the possibility that opinion change is related to policy attitudes. Yet,
presidents regularly engage in public position taking, providing information about their
policy priorities and positions. By analyzing six cases across three presidencies, this
paper has gone a long way toward making the case that policy attitudes exert a regular
and consequential influence on how people respond to the president. Repeatedly, policy
attitudes emerge as forces that shape how people update their presidential assessments.
Whereas previous research has shown that in the wake of dramatic political events that
receive extraordinary political attention citizens’ policy attitudes have influenced how
they update their opinions, the findings reported here suggest that policy updating is
more common and therefore consequential.
This paper’s results also provide insight into an important scholarly disagreement
(Gerber and Green 1998, 1999; Bartels 2002). Gerber and Green (1998, 1999)
observe that shifts in presidential approval among Democrats and Republicans are
typically in the same direction and of the same magnitude, and from this they infer
that there is no party bias in how people update their presidential evaluations. They
contend that if there was bias, then growing divergence would be evident. Bartels
(2002) argues that if people agree about the implications for presidential approval of
new information, then over time there would be convergence between Democrats
24 Further, as noted in the Appendix, if 1992–1994 and 2000–2002 are excluded and the dependent
variable is presidential job approval (with lagged job approval as the measure of preexisting evaluations),
the patterns of results follow those in Table 2.
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and Republicans. For Bartels, the lack of convergence evident in parallel movements
implies party bias. This claim would rest on firmer footing if the information
provided to the public was only valence information. When valence and policy
information are disseminated, as is typically the case in day-to-day politics, lack of
convergence may also imply policy updating because Democrats and Republicans
differ with regard to their policy preferences, with Democrats holding more liberal
economic and cultural attitudes and Republicans holding more conservative ones.
The meaning of parallel movements depends on the nature of the information
provided and the type or types of updating that occur among individuals.
The results reported in this paper also speak to an important question about
‘‘motivated reasoning’’ (Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber et al. 2001; Taber and Lodge
2006). Previous work emphasizes how having a psychological stake in an attitude can
lead an individual to distort new information to make it consonant with a preexisting
attitude, be that attitude about partisanship or policy. Indeed, motivated reasoning
may be the (or at least a) causal force that underlies the often noted consistency in
individual partisanship and policy attitudes (Green et al. 2002; Goren 2005;
Ansolabehere et al. 2008). The implications of motivated reasoning in the context of
presidential evaluations require paying attention to the fact that presidents are party
leaders who also engage in position taking. Because presidents are party leaders,
citizens have an incentive to update and revise their presidential evaluations in light
of their partisanship. At the same time, the importance of policy attitudes appears to
motivate people to update presidential evaluations based on the policy information
provided through presidential position taking. But, responding to the president on the
basis of one’s policy preferences has normatively different implications than
responding to the president on the basis on partisanship as reason noted at the outset of
this paper. The ultimate payoff from politics is policy. As Lasswell (1936) famously
put it, politics is about ‘‘who gets what, when, and how.’’ Parties are important as the
means through which the ends are obtained (Converse 1964). Consequently, while
distorting new information in order to maintain a policy preference that would
otherwise need to be changed is of a piece with distorting new information in order to
reinforce one’s partisanship, updating one’s view of the president in response to the
president’s policy signals is quite normatively different than updating one’s view of
the president in response to the president’s party affiliation.
Finally, the finding that policy updating occurs alongside party bias carries
important substantive implications. If there was party bias without policy updating,
then over time partisanship would becomes an ever increasing component of
evaluations. To the extent that citizens’ policy preferences coincide with their
partisanship (liberal preferences for Democrats and conservative preferences for
Republicans) and the President takes position consistent with his party, then party
bias would have the effect of bringing one’s policy preferences into alignment with
one’s presidential evaluations. But, while partisanship and policy preferences have
become more closely related over time, they remain far from perfectly correlated
(DiMaggio et al. 1996; Adams 1997; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman and
Carsey 2002; Stimson 2004; Brewer 2005; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Bafumi
and Shapiro 2009; Abramowitz 2010). Consequently, in the absence of policy
updating, a commonly aspired to form of democratic accountability, whereby
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elected officials are evaluated on the basis of the policy positions they take rather
than their partisanship, would be absent. Many people with conservative policy
attitudes would come to look favorably on relatively liberal Democratic presidents
and unfavorably on Republican presidents just as some people with liberal attitudes
would assess Republican presidents more positively than Democratic ones.
In conclusion, this paper does not challenge the proposition that partisanship is a
potent force influencing how the mass public responds to political events, but it does
suggest that accounts of mass politics that do not consider policy attitudes are
incomplete and misleading. In the case of the president, whatever the ingredients of
citizens’ initial assessments and opinions, they appear to update those evaluations in
response to policy information.
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Appendix
Measurement of Policy Attitudes
As described in the main text, to create a composite measure of Evaluations (E), I
combined responses across a variety of question formats and domains and then used
factor analysis to produce factor scores, which were subsequently used in the analysis.
In all cases, a single dominant factor emerged as indicated by the large eigenvalues for
the first factor and the small eigenvalues for the second, as reported in Table 7.
As described in the main text, I followed Ansolabehere et al. (2008) when
creating the measures of economic and cultural policy attitudes. The specific items
used in the scales are listed in Tables 4 and 5. Missing values were imputed using
best-subset linear regression, also following Ansolabehere et al. (2008). Without
imputation, the number of lost respondents would have been substantial. For
example, for 1990 only 55% of respondents answered all the economic and cultural
policy questions.25 For 1992, 1994, and 2000, the respective percentages were 41,
64, and 25. At the same time, most respondents did provide answers to most
questions as shown in Table 6. Within policy domains typically majorities (and
often large majorities) answered all the questions. Of those who had at least one
missing value, the vast majority had missing values for less than 25% of the items.
Dimensionality of Presidential Evaluations
As described in the main text, to create a composite measure of Evaluations (E), I
combined responses across a variety of question formats and domains and then used
factor analysis to produce factor scores, which were subsequently used in the
analysis. In all cases, a single dominant factor emerged as indicated by the large
25 62% of respondents answered all the economic questions; 83% answered all the cultural ones; and,
55% all the economic and all the cultural ones.
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eigenvalues for the first factor and the small eigenvalues for the second, as reported
in Table 7.
Job Approval
Job approval is the traditional measure used in studies of presidential evaluations,
especially at the aggregate level. To determine if the findings reported in Table 2
are consistent with what one would find if evaluations are based only on job
approval, I reestimated the models using job approval only as the indicator of
evaluations. The results are reported in Table 8 and are consistent with those
reported in Table 2 based on the full set of evaluation items. (Note: In two
instances—1992–1994 and 2000–2002—there is no measure of prior job approval
because Bush and Clinton were not yet president in 1992 and 2000, respectively.
Table 4 Indicators of economic policy preferences
Item Most liberal Most
conservative
1990 1992 1994 2000
Strong government v. free
market
Strong gov. Free market v900331 v925730 p001421





Size of government More Less v900333 v925729 p001420
Why government is big Big problems Too involved v900335 v925731 p001422
Fed spending on
environment
Increase Decrease v900377 v923815 v940817 p000682
Fed spending on AIDS Increase Decrease v900379 v923727 v940821 p000677
Fed spending on Social
Security
Increase Decrease v900380 v923811 v940819 p000681
Fed spending on food
stamps
Increase Decrease v900382 v923725 v940822 p000679
Fed spending on public
schools
Increase Decrease v900383 v923818 v940823 p000683
Fed spending on homeless Increase Decrease v900384 v923730
Fed spending on childcare Increase Decrease v900385 v923813 v940824 p000685
Fed spending on aid to
blacks
Increase Decrease v900386 v923729 p000687
Fed spending on welfare Increase Decrease v923726 v940820 p000676






Fed spending on poor Increase Decrease v923817 p000680
Fed spending on aid to big
cities
Increase Decrease v923819
Fed spending on health
care
Increase Decrease v940826
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Table 4 continued
Item Most liberal Most
conservative
1990 1992 1994 2000
Fed spending on defense Decrease Increase v940827
Guaranteed equal opp. Strong agree Strong disagree v900426 v926024 v940914 p001521
Equal rights pushed too
far
Strong disagree Strong agree v900427 v926025 v940915 p001522
Lack of equal chance a
problem
Strong agree Strong disagree v900428 v926027 v940916 p001523
Country better if worry
less about equality
Strong disagree Strong agree v900429 v926025 v940917 p001524
Not a problem if some
have better change
Strong disagree Strong agree v900430 v926029 v940918 p001525
Equal treatment means
fewer problems
Strong agree Strong disagree v900431 v926028 v940919 p001526
Spending on defense Greatly decrease Greatly
increase
v900439 v923707 v940929





Gov. aid to blacks Gov. should help Blacks should
help selves
v900447 v923724 v940936










Gov. child care to low
income
Should provide Should not
provide
v900488 v923745











































Limit on welfare benefits Oppose strongly Favor strongly v940949
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Table 5 Indicators of cultural policy preferences
Item Most liberal Most
conservative
1990 1992 1994 2000





Flag burning Should be legal Should be
against law
v900471




v900479 v923732 v941014 p000694a
Parental abortion
consent
Oppose strongly Favor strongly v900481 v923736 p000702





Disagree strongly Agree strongly v900500 v926118 v941029 p001530




v900501 v926115 v941030 p001531
Should emphasize
traditional family ties
Disagree strongly Agree strongly v900502 v926117 v941031 p001532




v900503 v926116 v941032 p001533
Notify husband before
abortion
Oppose strongly Favor strongly v923740
















Gay men and lesbians—
feeling therm.



























Disagree strongly Agree strongly v926119
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Table 6 Rates of missing data on policy items
Scale Percentage of items for which respondents had missing data
0 1–25 25–50 50? Total
1990 Economic Policy 62 37 1 0 100
1990 Cultural Policy 83 14 2 1 100
1992 Economic Policy 52 46 2 0 100
1992 Cultural Policy 70 29 1 0 100
1994 Economic Policy 72 27 0 0 99
1994 Cultural Policy 84 15 1 0 100
2000 Economic Policy 44 56 1 0 101
2000 Cultural Policy 57 40 3 0 100
Due to rounding, totals do not always add to 100
Table 7 Dimensionality of presidential evaluations
Year Eigenvalues associated with
Factor 1 Factor 2
1990 3.19 .27
1991 2.04 -.08
1992 (Bush) 3.40 -.01






As described in the main text, a variety of indicators were used to create the measure of presidential
evaluations. To test whether the indicators measured a single underlying latent variable, principal factor
analysis was used. The cell entries report the eigenvalues associated with the first and second factors. In
every case, it is clear that there is one dominant dimension of presidential evaluations
Table 5 continued
Item Most liberal Most
conservative
1990 1992 1994 2000
‘‘Partial birth’’ abortion
ban
Oppose strongly Favor strongly p000705
Federal government gun
regulation
A lot stronger A lot weaker p000731
a This question was asked a second time in the post-election interview (p001403). Answers to both items
were used for the cultural policy preference scale
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